Participants underwent different kinds of training on the permission type of Wason's Four-Card problem to determine whether transfer of general solution principles would occur to the arbitrary type of Wason's Four-Card problem. There were four training conditions: (a) practice, (b) practice with feedback, (c) problem comparison only, and (d) problem comparison with feedback. Those participants who performed problem comparison on permission problems during practice solved more arbitrary problems during testing than did those participants who did not perform problem comparison. These findings suggest that through problem comparison participants learned how to apply general rules of logic from practice.
affect reasoning is oftentimes adaptive and rational, there are clearly instances in which formal deductive reasoning is advantageous. Consider the following example adapted from Halpern (1996) :
Suppose you are accused of committing murder. You have an alibi from 11 :00 p.m. forward on the night in question. The medical examiner's report places the time of death at 10:30 p.m. In her closing argument, the prosecutor tells the jury that because you cannot reliably account for your whereabouts before 11 :00, you must have committed the murder. If the jurors fall for this line of reasoning and convict you based on the fact that you do not have an alibi, they would be committing the logical error of denying the antecedent. It is your attorney's responsibility to introduce reasonable doubt by pointing out that it is inappropriate (i.e., illogical) to assume you committed a murder just because you lack an alibi for the time in question. Your attorney must convince the jurors to reason deductively and to avoid erroneous inferences. The lack of an alibi does not provide conclusive evidence either way and in our system, if there is reasonable doubt, the jury must vote to acquit.
The purpose of the present study was to investigate whether training could promote domain-general deductive reasoning skills. Specifically, we assessed the transfer of deductive reasoning principles between different types of Wason's selection tasks. To solve Wason's selection task (a.k.a., the Four-Card problem) in a logically correct manner, thinkers must engage in conditional reasoning to test the validity of a rule (for an alternative analysis of the task, see Evans et aI., 1993; Oaksford & Chater, 1994) . The rule can be either arbitrary or thematic in content. Thematic rules involve linkages between problem elements that are consistent with everyday experience: If you eat your dinner, then you may have dessert. Arbitrary rules involve problem elements that typically are unrelated in everyday experience: If you drink soda, then you will hear a bell. Although the validity of both types of rules should be tested using arguments that follow the same logical form (i.e., modus ponens and modus tOllens), performance on arbitrary problems typically is much worse than performance on thematic problems (Manktelow, 1999) . One explanation for this discrepancy is that when the task contains realistic content solvers rely on their domain-specific experience (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Griggs & Cox, 1982) . On balance, when the task content is arbitrary, the thinker has no specific experience on which to rely and, hence, often chooses illogical solution paths (e.g., the matching bias) (Evans, 1984) . Because arbitrary and thematic selection problems are isomorphic, one question of interest is whether training on one type of problem would lead to facilitation for the other type of problem. Klaczynski, Gelfand, and Reese (1989) found an asymmetrical transfer effect between arbitrary and thematic problems: Training on arbitrary problems promoted solutions to thematic problems, whereas training on thematic problems did not transfer to arbitrary problems. After further investigation, Klaczynski (1993) found that transfer of solution procedures from thematic problems to arbitrary problems depended on the kind of thematic problem used. Cheng and Holyoak (1985) defined several types of thematic rules, two of which are causal rules and permission rules. The general form for causal rules is "If some event occurs, then some outcome results"; for example, "If a person eats too much, then that person will gain weight." The general form of permission rules is "If some action is taken, then some precondition must be met"; for example, "If a student is driving a car, then that student must be at least 16 years old." Cheng and Holyoak (1985) argued that these general classes of rules elicit domain-specific schemata that determine how the thinker proceeds. Klaczynski (1993) found that practice with feedback on causal problems promoted transfer to arbitrary problems, whereas practice with feedback on permission problems did not. These findings are consistent with Cheng and Holyoak's (1985) notion that, when possible, people reason using pragmatic schemas, rather than by applying abstract rules of logic. Logically correct responses to permission problems are consistent with those arrived at through the application of a permission schema, whereas logically correct responses to causal problems are inconsistent with causal schemas (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985) . Thus, according to Klaczynski (1993) , those exposed to permission problems during training apply their permission schema and receive positive feedback, whereas those exposed to causal problems find their causal schema inadequate and develop abstract rules to enhance performance. Those who develop abstract rules during practice are more likely to solve target problems that differ in type from source problems than are those who have not developed such rules.
If Klaczynski's (1993) analysis is accurate, then thinkers trained to develop domain-general rules should exhibit transfer to arbitrary problems, even if the source problems are of the permission type. To provide this type of training, practice must involve tasks that help thinkers decontextualize the solution principles (Perkins & Salomon, 1989) and that promote thinking dispositions that specify general strategies (Stanovich & West, 1998) . That is, practice must deemphasize problem specific content while accentuating general solution principles. Individuals who are skilled at decontextualization tend to be superior reasoners (Sa, West, & Stanovich, 1999) . Training techniques aimed at fostering this propensity to see (and to actively look fOT) the deep structure of deductive reasoning problems should result in successful transfer. Traditionally, on many types of problems, direct strategic instruction has been used to fill this role (Perkins & Salomon, 1989) . Platt and Griggs (1993) modestly facilitated solutions to arbitrary selection tasks when they supplemented the rules with instructions outlining the implication of the rule. For example, they presented the traditional arbitrary rule "If a card has a vowel on its letter side, then it has an even number on its number side" with the following explanation, "A card with an odd number on it can only have a consonant, but a card with an even number on it can have a vowel or a consonant." Explicit strategic instructions, such as those used by Platt and Griggs, help solvers to represent more fully the problem elements and hence to see more clearly the solution path. Another technique that has been shown to aid the abstraction of general solution is problem comparison. Both Gick and Holyoak (1983) and Cummins (1992) found that giving statements that highlighted deep structure similarities between isomorphic problems (e.g., Duncker's X-Ray problem) was effective in promoting transfer. Ansburg and Dominowski (2000) modified this procedure such that, during practice, participants were required to generate (rather than read about) the procedural similarities between solved problems. Because this modification proved to be a robust method for promoting solutions to verbal insight problems, Ansburg and Dominowski's problem comparison technique (along with strategic instructions) was used in the current work.
The present study investigated the hypothesis that training that required participants to complete a problem comparison task (which included embedded strategy instructions) would result in transfer from permission problems to arbitrary problems. The problem comparison plus strategy instruction training should promote decontextualized thinking and hence result in transfer. Requiring participants to perform problem comparison should train them to break problems into procedural component parts regardless of the problem content. In other words, problem comparison is intended to give solvers practice identifying the deep structure of problems and of their solutions. The strategy instructions provide an explicit framework for both deep structure identification and solution procedures. Through problem comparison and strategy instructions solvers should learn how to detect similarities among seemingly dissimilar problems and how to proceed once a problem has been categorized as a certain type. Feedback, however, focuses the solver on the surface structure of problems and, thus, makes it difficult for solvers to see connections between isomorphs. Feedback only explicitly informs the solver about the specific problem to which it pertains; thus, it is unlikely that feedback on its own would promote the generation of abstract solution strategies.
Method

Participants
Eighty-four students enrolled in Introduction to Psychology courses volunteered to participate in exchange for extra credit and a chance to win one of two randomly awarded $50.00 prizes. Of these participants, 13 failed to classify themselves as "Fluent, Native English Speakers"; therefore, their data were eliminated from further analysis. Data from two native English speakers were also eliminated because they reported having taken a class in logic. The final sample consisted of 43 females and 26 males whose mean age was 20.51 (SO= 5.07). Participants were randomly aSSigned to condition and were run individually.
Procedures
A 2 (yes feedback, no feedback) x 2 (yes problem comparison, no problem comparison) x 2 (forward order of practice problems, backward order of practice problems) factorial design was used. During the training phase, all participants were exposed to six permission problems. What follows is a sample problem, the others can be found in Klaczynski (1993) :
Your task on the following problem is to determine whether or not this rule is in effect: "If a student plays basketball, then that person must have at least a "c" average." This rule mayor may not be in effect. The diagram below represents four cards (A, B, C, & D). Each of these cards has two pieces of information on it. On one side of each card, there is information about whether a student plays basketball, and on the other side of the card, there is a student's average. For two of these cards, you can see whether the student plays basketball, but you cannot see his average on the other side of the card. For the other two cards, you can see the student's average on one side of the card, but you cannot see whether he plays basketball on the other side of the card.
Your task is to decide what additional information you would need to decide whether or not the above rule is in effect. For which of these four cards would the information on the OTHER side of the card help you test whether or not this rule is in effect?
Be sure to select all those cards that you need in order to make your decision, but only choose those cards that you definitely need! Indicate your selection, by writing the letter of the appropriate card in the space provided. There were two orders of practice problems. One order was created by randomly assigning the problems to position. Reversing the first, generated the second order. The two orders were counterbalanced across participants. Furthermore, the order in which the alternatives (p, q, -p, -q) appeared was randomized within each problem. There were four training conditions: feedback only, problem comparison only, problem comparison plus feedback, practice control. Participants assigned to the feedback-only condition were given 3 minutes to solve each problem. After each solution attempt, the participant was asked to read silently as the experimenter read aloud feedback in the form of an in-depth explanation of the correct response. Here is the feedback/explanation given for the Basketball Rule described above:
The correct answer is to select both the "Plays Basketball" and "0 Average" cards. The rule states that if "Plays Basketball" is on one side of the card, a "C average" or above must be on the other side.
The "Plays Basketball" card must be selected because the rule would be false if an average less than "C" was on the other. Likewise, the "0 Average" must be turned over because the rule implies that a person who has an average less than "C" cannot be playing basketball. Therefore, if the "0 Average" card has "Plays Basketball" on the other side the rule must be false.
The "Does Not Play Basketball" card does not have to be selected because this card could say either "A" average or "0" average and you would not learn anything about the truth of the rule. Finally the "A Average" card doesn't have to be selected either. This is because a person who has an A average does not have to play basketball, even if this card said "Does Not Play Basketball" on the other side, the rule could still be true.
The rest of the explanations used for feedback can be found in Klaczynski (1993) .
Those in the problem-comparison-only condition were given 6 minutes to read two solved permission problems and to complete the problem comparison task as follows. After the participants read the two solved problems, they read strategy instructions that described the underlying structure of Wason's selection task:
Both of these rules are made up of two parts, "If Event A" and "Then Event B". Each rule has the following general form: If Event A is on one side of the card, then Event B must be on the other side of the card.
The rule tells us about two situations: 1) If Event A is face-up, then Event B must always be on the other side.
2) If the card shows that Event B did not occur, Event A must not be on the other side.
To test whether or not the rule is in effect, you'll first need to identify the cards that show Event A, Event B, Not Event A, and Not Event B. Then you need to realize that if Event A occurs and Event B does not, the rule cannot be in effect. Therefore, you need to turn over the card that shows Event A to be sure that Event B is on the other side. Likewise, if Event B did not occur, but Event A did, then the rule cannot be in effect. Therefore, to test the rule you also need to turn over the card that shows that Event B did not occur to be sure that Event A is absent from the other side.
Then, participants were asked to label problem elements in terms of abstract notation (e.g., "Plays Basketball" is "Event A") and to write out a strategy that would help them solve both of the given problems (e.g., select the cards that show "Event A" and "Not Event B"). For example, after each participant read the Basketball Rule and its solution and the Ticketed Rule ("If a person is given a speeding ticket, then that person must have been driving over 65 mph.") and its solution, they would complete the following:
In the Ticketed Rule problem, the "Ticketed" card represents the "Event A" card, and the "55 mph" card represents the NOT Event B card. In the Basketball problem, what card represents the "Event A" card? (Answer: "Plays Basketball") What card represents the NOT Event B card? (Answer: "0 average") Now please write out a general strategy that would help you solve both the Ticketed Rule and Basketball Rule problem.
The experimenter corrected erroneous responses to the problem comparison task. The participants compared each problem to the one immediately preceding it such that a total of five problem comparisons were completed across the six practice problems.
The participants in the problem-comparison-plus-feedback condition were given 3 minutes to solve each practice problem and then they received the in-depth explanation of the answer. Once they solved two consecutive problems, these participants completed the problem comparison task. They were given 3 minutes to complete each of the five problem comparisons. Those in the practice-control condition were given 3 minutes to solve each of the practice problems without feedback.
During the test phase, all participants attempted to solve five arbitrary problems without feedback (see Appendix for the problems). Unlike the training phase, which was administered via paper-pencil, the test phase data were collected on a computer running MEL Professional, Version 2. To allow participants to become comfortable using the computer, the first arbitrary problem was used to illustrate how to interact with the computer interface. The order of the other four arbitrary problems was randomized across participant. Again, the order of the alternatives was randomized within each problem. Participants had 5 minutes to solve each of the target problems. After solving all of the target problems, the participants indicated their age, facility with English, and whether they had ever taken a logic course.
Results/Discussion
To analyze performance during practice a two-way ANOVA 3 (training condition) x 2 (order of practice problems) was conducted. Because participants assigned to the problem-comparison condition worked with already solved problems during practice, they did not attempt to generate solutions to any practice problems and hence were excluded from this analysis. The only factor that significantly affected the average solution rate for the 6 practice problems was training condition, F(2, 47) = 4.80, P = .013. Table 1 shows the mean solution rates to the practice problems and the associated standard errors by condition. The average solution rate to these thematic problems is about 10% lower than those reported by Klaczynski (1993) . Post-hoc Scheffe tests indicated that the only significant difference in solution rates was between the problemcomparison-plus-feedback condition and the practice-control condition (p = .011). To assess whether participants demonstrated any systematic changes in card choice strategy across the practice problems as a function of feedback condition, four repeated measures ANOVAs were performed on frequency of choosing the (a) p card, (b) q card, (c) -p card, and (d)-q card. In none of those analyses was there a significant interaction between feedback condition and practice problem ordinal position (all Fs < 1.2). The negative finding that, compared to a practicecontrol condition, feedback alone did not improve performance during practice replicates Klaczynski's (1993) work. However, problem comparison when paired with feedback does appear to be an effective way to improve performance on permission problems. The improvement over the practice control suggests that participants in the problemcomparison-plus-feedback condition learned to note similarities among the practice problems. Whether the participants in the problemcomparison-plus-feedback condition learned how better to solve permission problems or whether they learned more general deductive reasoning principles is best addressed by the next set of analyses. Solution rates to arbitrary problems usually falls around 10% (Klaczynski et aI., 1989) ; it was our hope to see the training package significantly improve that performance. If training that included problem comparison and embedded strategy instructions did lead participants to notice deep structure similarities and to apply general deductive reasoning strategies, then participants who underwent that type of training should perform better on the arbitrary target problems than should those participants whose training did not include problem comparison and embedded strategy instructions. A three-way ANOVA 2 (feedback) x 2 (problem comparison) x 2 (order of practice problems) on solution rate to target problems revealed a significant main effect for problem comparison, F(1, 68) = 5.49, p = .022. Figure 1 shows performance on target problems by training condition. Those who performed problem comparison during training, on average, solved 25% of the target problems (SE = 6.02), whereas those who did not perform the problem comparison task solved only 10% of the target problems (SE = 3.73) . This transfer effect is consistent with the notion that the problem comparison technique did indeed teach domain-general rules for rule testing. Although those who received feedback during practice performed numerically better than those who did not receive such feedback, feedback did not have a significant effect on solution rate, F(1, 68) = 1.89, P = .174. This null result replicates Klaczynski (1993) and was expected given the poor performance of the feedback group during practice. There was no significant interaction between feedback and problem comparison (F < 1) nor were there significant effects involving the order factor (all Fs < 1.5).
Consistent with Klaczynski's (1993) results, we found that feedback in the form of problem-specific explanations did not promote transfer from permission problems to arbitrary problems; however, when we required participants to perform problem comparisons and read strategy instructions during practice we found that solution procedures did transfer to arbitrary problems. This pattern of findings is consistent with the notion that the feedback, in the form of problem-specific explanations, did not foster the development of general rules for solution. Klaczynski argued that this failure to generate domain-general solution procedures occurred because the feedback was consistent with a preexisting permission schema. Essentially, participants developed a false sense of mastery and did not see a need to adjust their understanding. An alternative explanation that is consistent with the data from the current work is that the problem-specific feedback emphasized the surface structure of the permiSSion problems, rather than the deep structure. Sternberg and Frensch (1993) maintained that to promote transfer it must be made clear to solvers that the information taught during training is applicable across a variety of problems. If partiCipants in Klaczynski's (1993) study missed the underlying similarities among the permission problems, it would be unreasonable to expect that they would have seen meaningful commonalties between the permission and the arbitrary problems. The fact that feedback failed to facilitate solutions during practice in both Klaczynski's (1993) and the present work is consistent with the notion that the feedback manipulation did not make salient connections between the permission problems.
In contrast, the problem comparison technique used in the present study emphasized the deep structure of the permission problems by teaching solvers to identify important problem elements (i.e., p, -p, q, -q) regardless of the context. The embedded strategy instructions made explicit how to manipulate the problem elements for solution, independent of context. An interesting question for future investigations is whether feedback that does not accentuate domain-specific information would result in transfer from permission to arbitrary problems. Feedback might more effectively lead to transfer if it incorporated the embedded strategy instructions used in the problem comparison manipulation. For example, the feedback could (a) orient the solver to the fact that the problem is a statement of a rule that has two parts "Event A" and "Event B," (b) explicitly map the domain-specific terms of the rule under consideration onto the terms "Event A" and "Event B," and (c) describe correct testing of the rule using both the domain-specific terms and the more abstract "Event A" and "Event B." If such feedback proved a successful training method, then the notion that feedback must be schema inconsistent to be useful in the development of domain-general rules would be brought into question even further. In fact, the results from the current study suggest that such an approach might indeed lead to general transfer.
The training technique described in the present work may have been effective because it helped some participants develop a thinking style that encouraged the exploration of multiple solution paths. In other words, strategic instruction and problem comparison, compared to the other training tasks, may have taught participants to build more complete mental models that would then lead them to test more solution paths. Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) argued that one of the main reasons that thinkers have difficulty with the four-card task is that they tend to include only the information explicitly presented in the rule in their representation of the problem and thus have few solution paths to pursue. Further, Stanovich and West (1998) found that individuals who demonstrated a generally exploratory metacognitive tendency were more likely to solve selection tasks than were those who did not demonstrate that kind of thinking style. It would be interesting to assess the thinking styles of participants before and after training to determine if the changes would be consistent with Stanovich and West's (1998) work. Finally, a reasonable question to ask is whether transfer would have occurred if participants received only strategy instructions or completed only the problem comparison task. Here, the two training methods were combined because previous work has shown that solutions to arbitrary problems have been difficult to facilitate (Griggs & Cox, 1993) . Future work might explore whether both problem comparison and strategy instructions are necessary components of training. Could participants who simply perform problem comparison use that experience to generate and use a strategy that would be general enough to apply across all types of four-card problems? Together these training methods resulted in a 15% increase in solution rates to arbitrary problems. Although this gain is impressive, the absolute level of performance (one out of four problems correct) is still quite weak. Future research should be geared toward developing more powerful training methods.
